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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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The Russian banking sector includes approximately 1,000 
banks, but is it competitive? This paper analyzes bank 
competition in Russia during 2002–2008. The authors 
examine indicators of concentration and contestability, 
and compute non-structural measures of competition. 
They compare competition in Russia to that in Brazil, 
China, and India, and contrast competition across 
different groups of banks within Russia. Contestability in 
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Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at danzoategui@worldbank.
org, mmartinezperia@worldbank.org, and mmelecky@worldbank.org.
Russia is obstructed by uneven supervisory practices and 
an unclear exit process. Non-structural measures reveal 
that banks in Russia are less competitive than those in 
Brazil. Within Russia, large banks and state-owned banks 
exert more market power than the smaller and privately-
owned institutions. Finally, business-oriented banks are 
more competitive than those concentrating on lending to 
individuals.  
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1.        Introduction 
The Russian banking sector consists of 1,007 banks. This number is large both in 
absolute terms and even when compared to the number of banking institutions in countries of 
similar size such as Brazil (163), China (370), and India (169).
1  However, the Russian banking 
authorities recently increased minimum capital requirements and the number of banks is 
expected to decline as a result. As of February 2009, new banks need to comply with a minimum 
capital requirement of 180 million rubles (approximately US$6 million) in order to start 
operating and existing banks have to meet this requirement by January, 2012. Recently, the 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) predicted that approximately 200 banks would not be able to 
comply with this new limit. Furthermore, the Russian Finance Minister has publicly expressed a 
desire to take capital requirements to 1 billion rubles (US$ 33 million) within six years, a policy 
which if implemented will further reduce the number of banks in the system.
2 Hence, it is 
important to understand to what extent the banking sector in Russia is competitive to ascertain 
the potential impact of these reforms. 
The banking literature has shown that there are detrimental effects associated with lack of 
bank competition. In particular, studies have found that lack of competition in the banking sector 
can result in higher prices for financial products and reduced access to finance, especially for 
smaller firms (see Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004 and Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006, 
among others). Also, some studies have found that lack of bank competition can lead to less 
entry and growth of younger firms and also delayed exit of older firms (Cetorelli, 2003).   
Furthermore, though there is a significant debate on the implications of competition for banking 
sector stability, new evidence suggests that lack of competition can lead to fragility, especially if 
                                                            
1 The numbers for Russia as well as those for Brazil, China, and India do not reflect the importance of non-bank 
institutions such as credit cooperatives that also offer financial services in these countries.  
2 http://www.mn.ru/business/20100721/187941655.html 3 
 
certain banks become too big to fail (see Koskela and Stenbacka, 2000; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Levine 2006; Carletti, Hartmann, and Spagnolo, 2007; Schaeck and Cihak, 2008 among 
others).  
Using bank-level data for the period 2002-2008, this paper examines the extent of bank 
competition in Russia. We contrast banking sector competition in Russia to that in similar sized 
emerging countries, namely Brazil, China, and India. Furthermore, because the Russian banking 
sector is quite fragmented, we compare measures of competition for different groups of banks. In 
particular, we conduct tests to examine differences between the top 20 banks vis-à-vis other 
banks, government-owned banks vis-à-vis privately-owned institutions, foreign banks vis- à-vis 
domestic banks, and business-oriented vis-à-vis consumer-oriented banks.  
There are two main approaches to measuring bank competition: the structural approach 
and the non-structural approach. As the name suggests, the structural approach assesses bank 
competition by examining measures of market structure such as concentration ratios (the share of 
assets held by the top 3 or 5 institutions) or indices (e.g., the Herfindhal-Hirschman index). The 
theoretical justification for using concentration as a measure of competition comes from the so-
called Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm that postulates that fewer and larger firms 
(higher concentration) are more likely to engage in anticompetitive behavior.
3 However, studies 
have shown that at times concentration is not a reliable measure of competition (see Cetorelli, 
1999) and the link between concentration and performance is not always positive as suggested by 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (see Jackson, 1992). Furthermore, even 
concentrated banking sectors can be competitive if they remain contestable by promoting entry 
and exit. 
                                                            
3 For a discussion on the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm see Berger (1995). 4 
 
The non-structural approach based on the “New Empirical Industrial Organization 
literature” measures competition without using explicit information about the structure of the 
market. Instead, non-structural measures focus on obtaining estimates of market power from the 
observed behavior of banks. For example, Panzar and Rosse (1987) show that the sum of the 
elasticities of a firm’s revenue with respect to the firm’s input prices - the so-called H-statistic - 
can be used to identify the extent of competition in a market. Under perfect competition, the H-
statistic should be equal to one, since any increase in input prices should lead to a one-to-one 
increase in total revenues. This is true because those firms that cannot cover the increase in input 
prices will be forced to exit the market. By contrast, the H-statistic will be zero or negative if the 
firm operates as a monopoly—an upward shift in the marginal cost curve will be associated with 
no change or a reduction in revenue as a result of the optimality condition for the monopolist. If 
the banking sector is characterized by monopolistic competition, the H-statistic will lie between 
zero and one.  
An alternative non-structural measure of competition, the Lerner index, measures the 
markup banks charge their customers by calculating the difference between price and marginal 
costs, expressed as a percentage of the price. Higher values of the Lerner index imply lower 
levels of bank competition. 
Though there is an extensive literature using non-structural measures to assess 
competition in many developed and in some developing countries, to the best of our knowledge, 
there is only one study that has examined bank competition in Russia.
4  Fungáčová, Solanko, and 
                                                            
4 Studies using non-structural measures to examine competition in developed countries include: Nathan and Neave 
(1989), Shaffer (1993), Molyneux et al. (1994, 1996), Bikker and Groeneveld (1998), Hondroyiannis et al. (1999), 
De Bandt and Davis (2000), Bikker and Haaf (2002), Hempell (2002), Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), Coccorese 
(2004, 2005), Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005, 2007), Gischer and Stiele (2008), and Carbó et al. (2009).  There 
are fewer studies focusing on developing countries. These include: Gelos and Roldos (2004), which examine 
banking sector competition in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, and Turkey; 5 
 
Weill (2010) use quarterly data from the financial information agency Interfax and the Central 
Bank of Russia to calculate the Lerner index for banks in Russia between 2001 and 2007. The 
paper examines whether competition depends on the ownership type of banks by comparing 
market power across private, government-owned, and foreign banks. The authors find that bank 
competition in Russia is similar to that in other European Union countries and has only slightly 
improved during the period studied. Furthermore, they find no differences in market power 
across private, government, and foreign-owned banks. 
Our study adds to the work of Fungáčová, Solanko and Weill (2010) in several ways. 
Most importantly, rather than limiting our analysis to only one non-structural measure of 
competition, we pursue different approaches to ascertain the degree of banking sector 
competition in Russia. First, we examine various measures of concentration. Second, because 
concentrated banking sectors can be competitive as long as they are contestable (e.g. the 
Canadian banking system as shown by Allen and Engert, 2007), we analyze the regulations and 
supervisory practices affecting the ease of entry and exit into the banking sector to assess the 
degree of contestability. Third, as an alternative non-structural measure of competition, we 
calculate the Panzar and Rosse H–statistic. Finally, while Fungáčová et al. (2010) simply 
compare the Lerner Index for Russia with other authors’ estimates for European Union countries 
(Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos, 2007 and Cabo-Valverde et al., 2009) and contrast the 
estimates for banks in Russia across ownership types, we conduct rigorous tests to evaluate 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Mkrtchyan (2005), which focuses on Armenia; Prasad and Ghosh (2005), which investigates the case of India; 
Mamatzakis et al. (2005), Drakos and Konstantinou (2005), and Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) that study 
competition in Central and Eastern European countries; Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007), which analyzes banking 
competition in Latin America; and Anzoategui, Martínez Pería, and Rocha (2010) that focus on competition in the 
Middle East and North Africa region.  6 
 
differences between Russia and other countries (Brazil, China, and India) and across different 
bank groups within the country.  
Regarding this last exercise, we not only examine differences across different ownership 
types, but also we compare measures of market power for the top 20 banks (in terms of assets) 
vis-à-vis the rest and for banks focused on business lending vis-à-vis those specializing in 
financing individuals. Larger banks tend to have a more ubiquitous presence and, therefore, have 
the potential to offer services to a larger percentage of the population. Hence, it is important to 
ascertain the extent to which they exert excessive market power. Similarly, because individuals 
tend to rely more on banks to meet their financing needs, relative to corporations that can access 
capital markets and international sources of financing, it is relevant to determine the extent to 
which banks that focus on serving individuals are competitive.  
Our analysis reveals that though concentration levels in Russia are not high by 
international standards, contestability is being obstructed by differences in supervisory practices 
across institutions and an unclear and not entirely credible exit process. Furthermore, though 
both non-structural measures of competition reveal that bank competition in Russia is no 
different than that in China and India, banks in Russia are significantly less competitive than 
their Brazilian counterparts, even though concentration levels across Brazil and Russia are 
similar. Within Russia, the top 20 banks and state-owned banks seem to be able to exert more 
market power than the smaller banks and the privately-owned institutions. Finally, there is 
evidence of greater competition among banks focused on business lending relative to those that 
primarily cater to individuals.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main features 
of the Russian banking sector in order to provide some context for the analysis of competition in 7 
 
the country. Section 3 examines the recent evolution of commonly-used measures of bank 
concentration such as the share of assets held by the top five banks and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HH) index and compares these measures for Russia to those for Brazil, China, and 
India.  Section 4 reviews the regulatory and supervisory framework governing bank entry and 
operations as well as bank insolvency and exit in Russia. The objective of this section is to 
determine whether the regulatory and supervisory framework promotes contestability. Section 5 
describes the methodologies and data used to obtain the Panzar and Rosse H-statistic and the 
Lerner index of market power. Section 6 reports the estimates for the Lerner Index and the H-
statistic. Here we compare Russia to Brazil, China, and India and also investigate differences 
across groups of banks within Russia. Finally, Section 7 concludes and discusses some policy 
recommendations. 
 
2.       The structure of the Russian banking sector 
The Russian banking sector consists of 1,007 banks.
5  Despite the large number of 
institutions operating in the country, the Russian banking sector is fairly concentrated and 
dominated by state-owned banks. The largest 20 banks control approximately 70 percent of total 
bank assets and six government-controlled banks account for 52 percent of total bank assets and 
60 percent of deposits. The largest government-owned bank, Sberbank, is also the largest credit 
institution in the country and accounts for 25 percent of total assets of the Russian banking 
system. 
                                                            
5 This number and most of the statistics in this section come from the following publications produced by the 
Central Bank of Russia: “Review of the Banking Sector of the Russian Federation,” February 2010, and the 
“Bulletin of Banking Statistics”, January, 2010. 8 
 
Foreign bank presence is still relatively low in Russia. There are 108 credit institutions in 
the country with at least 50 percent foreign ownership. They account for about 18.3 percent of 
total banking assets and 12 percent of deposits.  
The majority of banks in Russia are focused on lending to firms. Over two-thirds of 
banks receive 50 percent or more of their interest income from lending to businesses. On 
average, across all banks, the share of income from lending to businesses is 59 percent.  On the 
other hand, the average share of income from lending to individuals is 25 percent and only 15 
percent of banks receive the majority (50 percent or more) of their interest income from lending 
to individuals. 
 
3.        Bank concentration in Russia 
Bank concentration in Russia declined almost consistently between 2002 and 2007 (see 
Figure 1). In 2002 the share of assets held by the top five banks stood at 56 percent and by 2007 
this ratio came down to 44 percent. Similarly, over this period the Herfindahl index fell from 
1574 to 775. However, as a result of a series of bank failures, mergers, and government 
takeovers concentration increased slightly in 2008. The share of assets held by the top five 
largest banks stood at 50 percent and the HH index reached 878.  
At first glance, bank concentration in Russia is in line with what is observed in other 
similar-sized emerging economies. In particular, concentration in Russia is similar to that in 
Brazil, lower than that in China, and somewhat higher than that for India (see Table 1).   
However, concentration in Russia seems more significant if we consider the fact that the number 
of banks in Russia is substantially higher than that in the three other countries.
6  
                                                            
6 The share of assets held by the largest 200 banks (a number in between the number of institutions in Brazil and in 
China) is close to 95 percent. 9 
 
Moreover, a factor that will prompt further consolidation in Russia is the increased 
minimum capital required for banks, introduced by the CBR in February 2009, of 180 million 
rubles (6 million US dollars). Existing banks have to comply with this limit by January 1, 2012.  
Using data from Interfax as of 2008, Table 2 shows the percentage of banks that can comply with 
the new capital requirement. While a majority of large banks, government owned banks, and 
foreign banks seem to have capital in excess of 180 million rubles, approximately 30 percent of 
non-top 20 banks, and a similar percentage of domestic and business-oriented banks do not 
appear to be able to comply with this requirement. In the case of individual-oriented banks, the 
percentage of banks unable to meet the new capital requirement is almost 50 percent. Banks 
unable to meet the new requirement will need to merge with other banks, transform into a 
different type of a financial institution which does not require banking license, or would be 
declared insolvent and resolved accordingly. This will have a significant impact on the number 
of banks and potentially on bank competition. 
 
4.        Banking sector contestability 
A concentrated banking sector can remain competitive if it is contestable, that is if entry 
and exit into the system is easy and if bank regulations and supervision promote a level-playing 
field across all banks. This section describes the regulations and practices governing bank entry 
and exit in Russia and discusses the implementation of bank regulations and supervision in the 
country. Furthermore, we compare the situation in Russia to that in Brazil, China, and India. 
Bank entry in Russia has been historically fairly easy.
7 In particular, during the early 
1990s the central bank issued a very large number of banking licenses. Between 1992 and 1995, 
                                                            
7 The information in this paragraph comes from Chapter 4 of the OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation, 
2009. 10 
 
the number of banks rose from 850 to close to 2400 by 1995. Aside from very low capital 
requirements (US$100,000) and loose fit and proper screening, there were other important 
reasons for the proliferation of banks in Russia.  In particular, banks unlike other corporations 
were allowed to deal in foreign exchange and could hold accounts with foreign banks. This 
meant that owning a bank could facilitate capital flight and money laundering. In addition, banks 
could be used as corporate treasuries for economic groups of non-financial enterprises. In other 
words, banks could funnel loans to related companies at rates of interest that had more to do with 
tax optimization than true cost of capital. Finally, banks also provided a vehicle for speculative 
investment in securities.  
Since the mid-1990s, the number of banks has fallen sharply in Russia. The financial 
crises the country experienced (in 1998 and, recently in 2008), the acquisition of regional banks 
by Moscow-based private banks trying to build national branch networks, and some efforts to 
crack down on illegal activities contributed to the decline in the number of banks.  Nonetheless, 
the number of banks in Russia is still large, relative to that in other similar-sized countries like 
Brazil, China, and India.  
Currently, the minimum capital required for new banks to start operating in Russia (US$ 
6 million) is lower than that for Brazil (US$ 9 million), but especially much lower than that 
required by banking authorities in China (US$ 50 million) and India (US$ 72.5 million). At the 
same time, the number of procedures required as part of the licensing process is similar in Russia 
to those of other countries and the license rejection rate (i.e., the percentage of bank licenses 
rejected relative to the number of applications) has been higher than that in Brazil (21% for 
Russia relative to 0 for Brazil), but is significantly lower than the rejection rate for India, which 
is reported to have reached 80% (see Table 3). 11 
 
In order to safeguard competition, bank supervision should be conducted in a way that 
ensures a level-playing field for all institutions. There are a number of reasons to be concerned 
with how bank supervision is conducted in Russia.
8 First, small and transparent banks could be 
disadvantaged compared to large and complex banks due to the absence of proper consolidated 
supervision. In other words, due to their complexity and because of the lack of adequate 
consolidated supervision larger banks could “get away with things” (like taking on excessive 
risks) that smaller banks cannot.  Second, the regional and functional fragmentation of the 
Russian banking system could be causing dispersion of supervisory practices across different 
types of banks and regions due to the potential for supervisory capture on one side or abuse on 
the other side. Third, the allocation of supervisory resources to regions decreased over time and, 
hence, supervision in the regions could be lacking and favoring improper competition in the 
regions compared with the Moscow district (see Table 4). Fourth, the overall operating 
environment for banking supervision could be distorted by relatively higher political influence 
compared to other large developing countries.  
The cross-country comparison of some institutional arrangements for supervising 
problem banks and dealing with failed banks also suggests some differences that may obstruct 
competition in Russia’s banking sector (see Table 5). Russia is the only BRIC country 
unequipped with legally enforced cease and desist orders.  Further, together with Brazil, Russia’s 
banking supervisors are not required to make timely disclosure of enforcement actions. While all 
BRICs’ banking supervisors have the power to suspend distribution of dividends, in Russia the 
banking supervisors cannot suspend the distribution of bonuses and management fees. This can 
have negative implications for market transparency, discipline, and effective dealings with 
                                                            
8 For a detailed discussion see World Bank (2010). 12 
 
problem banks. Furthermore, while Russia has a predetermined solvency level, breaching of 
which can trigger automatic intervention by the banking supervisor, the power of declaring a 
bank insolvent in Russia is legally in the hands of the courts. In contrast, in Brazil banking 
supervisors have all the legal powers to declare a bank insolvent. In all BRICs, the banking 
supervisors, sometimes in conjunction with the government or the court, have the authority to 
intervene and suspend some or all ownership rights in problem banks. However, Russia’s 
banking supervisors are limited in superseding shareholders’ rights.  
There have been some changes in the failing-bank resolution mechanism and procedures 
for bank exits as of late 2008. The initiative to undertake resolution interventions continues to 
reside with the Banking Supervision Committee of the CBR. As part of the legislative response 
to the financial crisis, major amendments to the powers and tools at the disposal of the Deposit 
Insurance Agency (DIA) for resolving failing banks were approved by the Russian Duma in 
October 2008.
9 The DIA is thus temporarily
10 authorized to: (i) provide financial assistance to 
individuals/entities buying shares of a distressed bank giving them control over the shareholders’ 
assembly; to banks buying assets and liabilities of a distressed bank in order to prevent its 
bankruptcy;  to buyers of shares in a distressed banks giving the buyer control over the distressed 
entity and preventing its bankruptcy;  to shareholders of a distressed bank to prevent its 
bankruptcy; (ii) organize asset auctions of collateral offered by insolvent banks, including 
collateral pledged to the CBR; and (iii) acquire provisional administration functions based on 
decisions made by the CBR.  
                                                            
9 The DIA has now four main functions: (i) administrator of the Deposit Insurance Fund – including the return of 
insured deposits to the public in case of bank failures; (ii) banks’ receivership functions; (iii) asset management 
company; and (iv) bank rehabilitation agency. 
10 There is a sunset clause for the DIA’s bank resolution powers, to the extent that it will expire in December, 2011 
when its effectiveness ends. 13 
 
In practice, in cases of distress, both the CBR and the DIA are likely to assess the 
financial condition of particular banks that might be subject to resolution. The DIA has up to ten 
days to decide on its participation and the terms of such participation, and to negotiate with the 
parties (the CBR, potential investors, and bank owners) before engaging in a bank rescue 
operation. The CBR’s Supervision Committee must approve the DIA’s Action Plan within ten 
days of its submission. If the CBR resources are involved, the Board of Governors of the CBR 
must approve the Action Plan.
11  
During the crisis period, the DIA resolved a large number of banks. For instance, in the 
last quarter of 2008, the DIA dealt with 20 banks, out of which participations in 5 failing banks 
resolutions were rejected as their rehabilitation was not viable, 10 failing banks received 
financial support and were sold to new owners, in 2 failing banks the DIA became the owner, 
and assets and liabilities of 3 failing banks were transferred to other banks and those banks were 
sent into liquidation. Anecdotal evidence suggests improved performance of the bank resolution 
framework during the crisis period. However, it is not clear whether least-cost measures were 
implemented during this period. Moreover, it is not clear how exactly the objective of the DIA is 
stated concerning possible tradeoffs between protection of depositors, protection of creditors and 
minimizing of losses and disruptions to the overall financial system. In sum, the current 
resolution system is very new, has been only tested in the crisis period, and it is yet to be seen 
how this system performs in facilitating credible and efficient exit of banks during tranquil 
                                                            
11 The CBR has the right to reduce the capital of the distressed bank to its “fair value” if shareholders have not 
already done so. If the equity capital is negative it is reduced to one ruble. The Law authorizes the CBR to transfer 
to a staff member of the DIA the functions of Provisional Administrator to manage the day to day restructuring of 
the intervened bank, including the full or partial transfer of the assets and liabilities of the bank. The Law foresees 
that the DIA can access CBR resources - in the form of loans - or even request budgetary support from the Federal 
Government in case the resources from the Deposit Insurance are insufficient.  14 
 
periods. Clear objectives and ensuring the least-cost resolution for failing banks is required going 
forward in order to promote banking sector contestability.  
 
5.       Methodologies and data to compute the H-statistic and the Lerner index 
Based on the Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987) methodology and following the empirical 
strategy pursued by Classes and Laeven (2004), we obtain the H-statistic by estimating equation 
(1) below: 
 
Ln(Pit)= αi + β1 ln(W1,it) + β2 ln(W2,it) + β3 ln(W3,it) +  γ ln(Zit) + δDt + εit  (1) 
 
where i denotes banks and t denotes years. P is the ratio of gross revenues to total assets (proxy 
for banks’ output price), W1 is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market 
funding (proxy for input price of deposits), W2 is the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 
(proxy for input price of labor) and W3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses 
to total assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). Z is a matrix of controls 
including the ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio of net loans to total assets, and the logarithm 
of assets. D is a matrix of year dummies. αi  denotes bank-level fixed effects. The error term it is 
assumed to be normally distributed and equation (1) is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). 
The H-statistic equals β1+β2+β3, the sum of the input price elasticities of total revenues. 
Conceptually, the statistic measures the responsiveness of bank revenues to input prices. An H- 
statistic less or equal to 0 is interpreted as a sign of a monopoly; H equal to 1 indicates perfect 
competition, and when H is between 0 and 1 the sector operates under monopolistic competition.  15 
 
The test of perfect competition is only valid if the market is in long-run equilibrium. To 
verify this condition, the following regression is estimated via OLS: 
 
Ln(ROAit)= αi + β1 ln(W1,it) + β2 ln(W2,it) + β3 ln(W3,it) +  γ ln(Zit) + δDt + it  (2) 
 
Where ROA is the pre-tax return on assets. Because ROA can take on negative values, we 
compute the dependent variable as ln(1+ROA). W1, W2, W3, Z, and D are defined above. αi  
denotes bank-level fixed effects and the error term it is assumed to be normally distributed. We 
define the equilibrium E-statistic as β1+β2+β3 from equation (2). The test of long-run equilibrium 
involves testing whether E=0. In other words, the market is in equilibrium if return on assets is 
not related to input prices.
12  
The Lerner Index is computed using the formula (P-MC) / P, where P is the price of 
banking outputs and MC is the marginal costs. Following the approach in Fernandez de Guevara, 
Maudos and Perez (2005, 2007) and Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2008), we proxy bank 
output using total assets, P is calculated as total bank revenues over assets, and MC is calculated 
by taking the derivative from a translog cost function shown in equation (3): 
 
Ln(Cit) = a0i + b0 ln(Qit) + b1 0.5 [ln(Qit)]
2 + a1 ln(W1it )+ a2 ln(W2it) + a3 ln(W3it)+  
b2 0.5 ln(Qit)*ln(W1it)+b30.5ln(Qit)*ln(W2it)+b40.5ln(Qit)*ln(W3it)+a4ln(W1it)*ln(W2it)+ 
a5ln(W1it)*ln(W3it)+a6ln(W2it)*ln(W3it)+a7 0.5[ln(W1it)]
2 + a8 0.5[ln(W2it)]
2 +  
a9 0.5[ln(W3it)]
2 + δDt + uit  (3) 
 
                                                            
12  We do not present separate tables with results for the equilibrium tests, but rather in at the bottom of Tables 6-8 
we indicate if any of the estimates of the H-statistic fail these tests. 16 
 
where i denotes banks and t denotes years. C is total operating plus financial costs, Q is total 
assets, W1, W2, and W3 are the same input prices used in equations (1) and (2) and defined above. 
D and α0i denote time effects and bank-level fixed effects, respectively. As in most papers, our 
estimations impose the restrictions of symmetry and degree one homogeneity in the price of 
inputs.
13  
We compute the H-statistic and the Lerner index using bank-level balance sheet and 
income statement data from Bankscope for the period 2002-2008. We compare competition in 
Russia to that in Brazil, China, and India using similar Bankscope data for these countries. 
Appendix Table A1 reports the number of banks and observations that go into the calculations of 
the H-statistic and the Lerner index for each country in each year. Also, because Russia has a 
fragmented banking sector, we compute and compare the H-statistic and Lerner index across 
different groups of banks, namely: top 20 banks (in terms of assets), non-top 20, government- 
owned, privately-owned, foreign-owned, domestic-owned, business-oriented, and individual- 
oriented. 
 
6.        Results for the H-statistic and the Lerner index 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that the Russian banking sector can be best characterized as 
operating under monopolistic competition, given an H-statistic equal to 0.74 and considering that 
we can reject the nulls that the H-statistic equals zero and, also, 1. The same can be said about 
the banking sectors in Brazil, China, and India. Brazil appears to be more competitive than 
Russia, since the value of the H-statistic for the former is significantly higher than that for the 
latter.  
                                                            
13 However, the results do not change if we drop these constraints. 17 
 
Table 6 also shows the average (Panel B) and the median (Panel C) Lerner indexes for 
banks in Russia and for banks in each of the comparator countries. This table confirms the 
finding that the Russian banking sector is less competitive than the Brazilian one, since the 
Lerner index which measures market power is higher for the former than for the latter. On the 
other hand, based on the Lerner index, we find that the Russian banking sector appears to be 
more competitive than that of China and also India, since the Lerner index is significantly lower 
for Russia than for these countries. 
Given the large number and different types of banks in Russia, it is interesting to 
investigate whether the non-structural measures of competition for banks in Russia vary 
depending on the group of banks considered. Table 7 and 8, respectively, report the H-statistic 
and Lerner index for the following groups of banks: (a) the top 20 banks versus the remaining 
banks, (b) government-owned versus privately-owned banks, (c) foreign versus domestic banks, 
(d) business-oriented versus individual-oriented banks. 
According to the H-statistics (Table 7), government-owned banks appear to be less 
competitive (have lower values of the H-statistic) than privately-owned banks, at the 10 percent 
significance level. Also, banks focused on lending to individuals are less competitive than those 
that concentrate on financing businesses. Based on the calculations and tests for the Lerner index 
(Table 8) we find that the top 20 banks appear to exert more market power relative to smaller 
banks. On the other hand, we find no significant differences in the competitive behavior of 





7.        Conclusions 
  The Russian banking sector is fragmented. Relative to other comparable countries, Russia 
appears to have too many banks as a result of historically low barriers to entry. To a large degree, 
the proliferation of banks in the country has been related to low levels of minimum statutory 
capital requirements, but also to improper screening of applicants. Furthermore, tax loopholes, 
money laundering, and speculation have been common incentives for bank entry.  
The large number of institutions and the limited resources available to the CBR have 
made supervision a great challenge. The CBR is trying to remedy this in part by increasing 
minimum capital requirements expecting to focus their supervision resources. The problem with 
this strategy is that it is likely to significantly reduce the number of banks in the country. This 
may not be a good strategy considering that the Russian banking sector is fairly concentrated and 
less competitive than other similar-sized economies such as Brazil. At the same time, there is 
some evidence that the largest banks and government-owned banks, which already play a 
dominant role in the country and have no problem meeting the higher capital requirements, are 
able to exert market power. Also, we find some evidence of larger market power among banks 
that are primarily oriented to serve individuals rather than firms. This is problematic given that 
individuals typically have fewer financing options than corporations. 
Therefore, while it might be true that the number of banks in Russia is large, it is not 
clear that the way to deal with the problem is to continue to raise capital requirements across the 
board as proposed by the Russian authorities. Doing so, might further reduce competition and 
limit access to finance. Rather, Russian authorities might be best served by directly addressing 
the issues that have led both to the excessive proliferation of banks and to cases of bank 
insolvency. In other words, it might be best to tackle the issue of “excess banks” by closing the 19 
 
existing loopholes and by reevaluating and improving the licensing process. Furthermore, it is 
important to consider that, given the limited human and budgetary resources available for bank 
supervision, creating larger and likely more complex institutions will make the task of 
supervision harder and not necessarily easier.  20 
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Table 1: Concentration ratios and number of banks in BRIC
* countries 
Countries  Share of assets 














Russia 50  878  1007 
Brazil 48  903  167 
China 77  2655  370 
India 37  479  169 
*BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, China and India.  
Source: Bankscope, Central Bank of Brazil, Reserve Bank of India 
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Table 2: Percentage of banks that meet the new capital requirements of 180 million rubles 
 
  
% of banks with capital  ≥ 
180 million rubles 
% of banks with capital < 
180 million rubles 
Top 20 banks  100% 0% 
Non-top 20 banks  70% 30% 
Government -owned banks  100% 0% 
Privately-owned banks  70%  30% 
Foreign-owned banks  92%  8% 
Domestic-owned banks  69%  31% 
Individual-oriented banks  53%  47% 
Business-oriented banks  74%  26% 
Source: Interfax 27 
 
Table 3: Minimum capital requirements and bank licensing in BRICs
* 
  
Russia Brazil  China  India 
Minimum capital entry requirement  
(USD millions) 
- Domestic banks  6  9  50  72.5 
- Subsidiary of a foreign bank  6  9  39  72,5 
- Branch of a foreign bank  n/a  9  13  25 
Licensing requirements (number of legal 
requirements)  8  8 8 6 
Share of bank license applications 
rejected (%)  21 0  n.a.  80 
*BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, China and India.  n.a. stands for “not available”. Source: 2007 World Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey . 
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Table 4: Number of CBR off-site and on-site supervisory staff 
Off-site On-site 








2002  149   1,403   37   1,048  
2003  160   1,451   92   1,045  
2004  169   1,450   130   955  
2005  173    1,242   149   984  
2006  165    1,225   151   981  
2007  159    1,162   147   941  
2008  174    1,186   150   850  
Source: CBR Annual Banking Supervision Report 
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Table 5: Institutional arrangements for dealing with problem banks in BRICs
* 
   Russia Brazil India China 
A mechanisms of cease and desist type orders exists, 
whose infraction leads to automatic sanctions on bank 
management 
No  Yes Yes Yes 
BS is required to make public formal enforcement 
actions, including cease and desist orders and written 
agreements 
No No  Yes  Yes 
BS can suspend the directors' decision to distribute 
dividends  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
BS can suspend the directors' decision to distribute 
bonuses or management fees  No  Yes Yes Yes 
Banking law establishes predetermined solvency levels 
breaching of which forces automatic actions such as 
interventions 
Yes  No      No**  No 
Who can legally declare that a bank is insolvent -- with 
the declaration superseding some of the rights of 
shareholders 
C BS  --- C 
According to the banking law, who has the authority to 
intervene, i.e. suspend some or all ownership rights in 
a problem bank?  
BS BS  BS,G  BS,C 
Can a government agency remove and replace 
management & directors, forbear certain prudential 
regulations, and supersede shareholder rights? 
No  Yes Yes Yes 
* BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, China and India.  2007 data; BS, C, G stand for banking supervisor, court and 
government respectively. 
* * However, RBI has recently put in place a Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework 
under which certain interventions by supervisor are envisaged with some predetermined levels of solvency 
deterioration.                 30 
 
Table 6: H-Statistics and Lerner indices for BRICs
* 
Statistics Russia  Brazil  China  India 
Panel A: H –statistics 
H-statistic  (2002-2008)  0.741 0.821 0.73  0.683** 
[Std  Error]  0.017 0.052 0.048 0.065 
P-value for H-stat.=0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
P-value for H-stat.=1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
P-value for H-stat. Russia= H-stat. other vs. H-stat. Russia  <  H-stat. other    0.05 0.69 0.92 
P-value for H-stat. Russia= H-stat. other vs. H-stat. Russia > H-stat. other    0.95 0.31 0.08 
Panel B: Average Lerner indices 
Lerner  (average  2002-2008)  0.138  0.054  0.209  0.145 
[Std Error]    0.010  0.007  0.005 
P-value for  Lerner Russia = Lerner other vs. Lerner Russia < Lerner other    1.00 0.00 0.09 
P-value for Lerner Russia = Lerner other vs. Lerner Russia > Lerner other    0.00 1.00 0.91 
Panel C: Median Lerner indices 
Lerner  (median  2002-2008)  0.116 0.069 0.211 0.141 
P-value for Lerner Russia = Lerner other vs. Lerner Russia < Lerner other    1.00 0.00 0.00 
P-value for Lerner Russia = Lerner other vs. Lerner Russia > Lerner other    0.00 1.00 1.00 
*BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, China and India.  ** denotes rejection of  the long run equilibrium hypothesis. 
Source: authors calculations based on Bankscope data.31 
 
Table 7: H-statistics across groups of banks operating in Russia, 2002-2008 
Stats  Top 20  Non-
top 20 




H-statistic (2002-2008)  0.735  0.742  0.562  0.742 0.717 0.737  0.75  0.683 
[Std Error]  0.021 0.017  0.108  0.017 0.021  0.018 0.021 0.036 
p-value H-stat.=0  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
p-value H-stat.=1  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
P-value H-stat. Top 20 = H-stat. Non-top20 vs. H-stat. Top20 < H-stat. Non-top20  0.29             
P-value H-stat. Top20 = H-stat. Non-top20 vs. H-stat. Top20 > H-stat. Non-top20  0.71             
P-value H-stat. Govt. = H-stat. Private vs. H-stat. Govt. < H-stat. Private      0.05         
P-value H-stat. Govt. = H-stat. Private vs. H-stat. Govt. > H-stat. Private      0.95         
P-value H-stat. Foreign = H-stat. Domestic vs. H-stat. Foreign < H-stat. Domestic          0.12     
P-value H-stat. Foreign = H-stat. Domestic vs. H-stat. Foreign > H-stat. Domestic          0.88     
P-value H-stat. Business = H-stat. Individual vs. H-stat. Business < H-stat. Individual              0.95 
P-value H-stat. Business = H-stat. Individual vs. H-stat. Business > H-stat. Individual              0.05 
“Top 20” refers to the largest 20 banks by assets. “Govt.” refers to government owned banks while “Private” refers to privately owned banks. “ Domestic” refers to domestically owned banks and 
“Foreign” refers to foreign owned banks. “Business oriented” banks are those focused on lending to businesses and “Individual oriented” cater primarily to individuals. Note: the long run equilibrium 
hypothesis is accepted in all cases. Source: calculations by authors using Bankscope data.32 
 
Table 8: Lerner indices across banks operating in Russia, 2002-2008 
 Top  20  Non-
top 20 




Lerner  (average  2002-2008)  0.167  0.136  0.153 0.138 0.134  0.139  0.138  0.143 
[Std Error]  0.012  0.012  0.026 0.026 0.014  0.014  0.003 
 
0.007 
P-value Lerner Top 20 = Lerner Non-top 20 vs. Lerner Top 20 < Lerner Non-top 20  0.99             
P-value Lerner Top 20 = Lerner Non-top 20 vs. Lerner Top 20 > Lerner Non-top 20  0.01             
P-value Lerner Govt. = Lerner Private vs. Lerner Govt. < Lerner private    0.72         
P-value Lerner Govt. = Lerner Private vs. Lerner Govt. > Lerner Private      0.28         
P-value Lerner Foreign = Lerner Domestic vs. Lerner Foreign < Lerner Domestic        0.38     
P-value Lerner Foreign = Lerner Domestic vs. Lerner Foreign > Lerner Domestic          0.62     
P-value Lerner Business =Lerner Consumer vs. Lerner Business < Lerner Consume            0.24 
P-value Lerner Business = Lerner Consumer vs. Lerner Business > Lerner Consumer              0.76 
Lerner  (median  2002-2008)  0.144  0.114  0.169 0.117 0.113  0.118  0.114  0.106 
P-value Lerner Top 20 = Lerner Non-top 20 vs. Lerner Top 20 < Lerner Non-top 20  1.00             
P-value Lerner Top 20 = Lerner Non-top 20 vs. Lerner Top 20 > Lerner Non-top 20  0.00             
P-value Lerner Govt. = Lerner Private vs. Lerner Govt. < Lerner private    0.82         
P-value Lerner Govt. = Lerner Private vs. Lerner Govt. > Lerner Private      0.18         
P-value Lerner Foreign = Lerner Domestic vs. Lerner Foreign < Lerner Domestic        0.41     
P-value Lerner Foreign = Lerner Domestic vs. Lerner Foreign > Lerner Domestic          0.59     
P-value Lerner Business =Lerner Individual vs. Lerner Business < Lerner Individual              0.81 
P-value Lerner Business = Lerner Individual vs. Lerner Business > Lerner Individual              0.19 
“Top 20” refers to the largest 20 banks by assets. “Govt.” refers to government owned banks while “Private” refers to privately owned banks. “ Domestic” refers to domestically owned banks and 
“Foreign” refers to foreign owned banks. “Business oriented” banks are those focused on lending to businesses and “Individual oriented” cater primarily to individuals. Source: calculations by authors 




Table A1: Number of banks per year and total number of observations by country, 2002-2008   
Year Russia  Brazil  China  India 
2002 141  114  45  60 
2003  148  94 52 61 
2004  488  92 61 61 
2005  679  86 81 61 
2006 841  88  109  62 
2007 891  96  114  59 
2008  786  84 75 55 
Observations  3974  654 537 419 34 
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Share top 5 banks HHI (right axis)